Previous research into consumer choice of service channels studied the impact of online access as an addition to conventional service. Here, we study the impact of a compulsory migration to an online channel. We exploit a natural experiment in the implementation of a new federal government service to identify the causal effect of access channel on consumer choice. The government served western states through the Internet and telephone at all times. However, for the first 10 days, the government served the East through the Internet only. Comparing consumer responses in the East (only Internet service available) and West (both Internet and telephone service available), we find robust evidence that some consumers preferred telephone access. The unavailability of telephone service in the first 10 days resulted in a 4.3% loss of consumers who were otherwise interested in the service.
The rapid growth of computer networks has led to a proliferation of information security standards. To meet these security standards, some organizations outsource security protection to a managed security service provider (MSSP). However, this may give rise to system interdependency risks. This paper analyzes how such system interdependency risks interact with a mandatory security requirement to affect the equilibrium behaviors of an MSSP and its clients. We show that a mandatory security requirement will increase the MSSP's effort and motivate it to serve more clients. Although more clients can benefit from the MSSP's protection, they are also subjected to greater system interdependency risks. Social welfare will decrease if the mandatory security requirement is high, and imposing verifiability may exacerbate social welfare losses. Our results imply that recent initiatives such as issuing certification to enforce computer security protection, or encouraging auditing of managed security services, may not be advisable.
The advent of the Internet has made the transmission of personally identifiable information more common and often unintended by the user. As personal information becomes more accessible, individuals worry that businesses misuse the information that is collected while they are online. Organizations have tried to mitigate this concern in two ways: (1) by offering privacy policies regarding the handling and use of personal information and (2) by offering benefits such as financial gains or convenience. In this paper, we interpret these actions in the context of the information-processing theory of motivation. Information-processing theories, also known as expectancy theories in the context of motivated behavior, are built on the premise that people process information about behavior--outcome relationships. By doing so, they are forming expectations and making decisions about what behavior to choose. Using an experimental setting, we empirically validate predictions that the means to mitigate privacy concerns are associated with positive valences resulting in an increase in motivational score. In a conjoint analysis exercise, 268 participants from the United States and Singapore face trade-off situations, where an organization may only offer incomplete privacy protection or some benefits. While privacy protections (against secondary use, improper access, and error) are associated with positive valences, we also find that financial gains and convenience can significantly increase individuals' motivational score of registering with a Web site. We find that benefits--monetary reward and future convenience--significantly affect individuals' preferences over Web sites with differing privacy policies. We also quantify the value of Web site privacy protection. Among U.S. subjects protection against errors, improper access, and secondary use of personal information is worth $30.49--$44.62. Finally, our approach also allows us to identify three distinct segments of Internet...
This paper reports the results of an exploratory field experiment in Singapore that assessed the values of two types of privacy assurance: privacy statements and privacy seals. We collaborated with a local firm to host the experiment on its website with its real domain name, and the subjects were not informed of the experiment. Hence, the study provided a field observation of the subjects' behavioral responses toward privacy assurances. We found that (1) the existence of a privacy statement induced more subjects to disclose their personal information but that of a privacy seal did not; (2) monetary incentive had a positive influence on disclosure; and (3) information request had a negative influence on disclosure. These results were robust in other specifications that used alternative measures for some of our model variables. We discuss this study in relation to the extant privacy literature, most of which employs surveys and laboratory experiments for data collection, and draw related managerial implications.
Digital products are now widely traded over the Internet. Many researchers have started to investigate the optimal competitive strategies and market environments for such products. This paper studies the competitive decisions made about software, a major class of digital products that can be easily sold through computer networks. Instead of focusing on traditional competitive dimensions, such as price or quantity, we study the number of functions that should be incorporated into the software. Using game theoretic analysis, we show that there is no fixed strategy that is optimal for software developers in a duopoly market with one-stage simultaneous moves. This happens because, given one developer's decision, there is always an incentive for the other developer to deviate and achieve higher payoffs. Nevertheless, a unique reactive equilibrium does emerge if we consider the two-stage variation of the model, where the two developers both enjoy substantial profits by serving different segments of the market. Essentially, the first mover commits himself to a certain functionality level that induces a rational follower to target his software to the (previously) unattended segment. We discuss our results in light of scale economies in the software development process and market segmentation.
Despite the important role of vendors in the IT procurement process, very few studies have considered vendor characteristics and their effects on the decision outcome of IT managers. In this paper, we present a discrete choice model to examine the effects of vendor characteristics on the purchase decisions of IT managers. Our intent is to empirically assess the effects of product variety, brand name, average price, and network externalities in the selection of computer vendors. To ensure that the effects are not technology-dependent, we deliberately use long time series data to calibrate the model. Annual data at the vendor level from 1965 to 1993 is used to infer the choice criteria of IT managers in three computer categories: mainframe, minis, and small systems. Our empirical findings indicate that a broader product line and a strong brand can effectively enhance the choice probability of a vendor. Implications of these findings and possible extensions are also discussed.